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Interaction between 
the public and 
private sectors 
and the overall 
efficiency of 
the economy 
Juan M.F. Martin* 
The countries of Latin America are confronting the 
challenge of dealing with a restructuring of their 
economies on the basis of adverse conditions result-
ing from the crisis. Neither the neoliberal State nor 
traditional interventionism can perform the exact-
ing task that the crisis situation and the need for 
transformation demand. On the contrary, what is 
needed is a joining of forces by the social and produc-
tive sectors which proceeds from the assumption 
that competition is not only internal but also 
international. 
As shown by the successful experience of some 
countries of the developing world, the role of the 
State is crucial in this context, but it is necessary to 
change its traditional libretto: less regulation and 
more promotion of development. Greater decentral-
ization of decisions would make it possible to expand 
the capacity for innovation. Thus, it would be desira-
ble —for reasons of social rationality— to combine 
planning and the market instead of insisting that 
they oppose each other. Indeed, what is needed is to 
promote a new arrangement of public, State and 
private interests which will be more functional, so as 
to establish a virtuous circle of relationships. The 
reason is simple but powerful: the mixed nature of 
an economy is determined not only by the obvious 
Coexistence of various forms of ownership but also 
by their interactions and articulations and by the 
modalities of functioning of the economy as a whole. 
The purpose is not the thoughtless dismantling of 
the present system of regulations and the State-
controlled productive apparatus, but rather its 
rationalization —in a gradual and clearly understood 
manner— so as to improve the overall efficiency of 
the economy, in its public and private sectors. 
In this context, the policy of public enterprises 
should be revised, to concentrate on strategic and 
priority activities at the macro level and to moder-
nize their structure and regain the entrepreneurial 
spirit at the micro level. 
•Co-ordinator of the Public Sector Programming 
Area of ILPES. 
Introduction 
The expansion of the public-enterprise sector 
(PES), especially during the last two decades, has 
been a generally observed phenomenon in 
mixed economies, not only in the developing 
countries of the world but also in the developed 
countries. 
One of the basic characteristics of the PES in 
the context of Latin American countries is its 
marked heterogeneity, with regard to the forms 
of juridical organization, to the asset structure of 
its enterprises, to the nature of the goods and 
services it provides and to the various markets 
and social needs towards which it is oriented, 
even including the actual history of the creation 
of each enterprise or its incorporation into the 
public sector. In reality there exist several paral-
lel histories in the shaping of the PES which are 
governed by different rationales. For this reason, 
it is pointless to diagnose the problems of the 
sector without some reference to its heteroge-
neity, or to establish uniform policies for such a 
complex and diverse reality. 
The PES has played a deliberate and decisive 
role in the consolidation of the independent 
national States of the region and their process of 
economic and social development. However, 
some national analyses agree in pointing to a 
growth of the PES during the past few years that 
was not necessarily planned; this growth has 
been the result of ad hoc solutions for problems 
of economic policy (for example, the incorpora-
tion of private enterprises which have gone 
bankrupt) rather than the consequence of a long-
term orientation towards a growing nationaliza-
tion of the economy. 
When this result is understood in its 
entirety, the PES constitutes a complex and 
diversified technical, economic and financial 
conglomerate which is very difficult to manage 
and control effectively; some of the factors 
involved are: the difficulties encountered in 
administering conglomerates of large dimen-
sions (public or private); the excessive demands 
made on disarticulated public apparatuses; and 
the difference between State ownership and the 
capacity for effective public management. 
Furthermore, these conglomerates operate 
in the context of economies which exhibit visible 
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signs of overall inefficiency, both in the public 
sector and in the private sector, in a perverse 
circle of integration. Consequently, taking aim 
solely at the lack of efficiency in the PES does not 
seem the most satisfactory approach; it seems 
more appropriate to stress the need for increas-
ing the overall efficiency (public and private) of 
the economy in order to improve its foreign 
competitiveness and to rationalize its internal 
functioning. 
The difference between opinions and reali-
ties and the difficulties in understanding what is 
happening with State intervention in Latin 
America are due partly to the lack of a theory 
capable of explaining the real functioning of a 
mixed economy and providing a foundation for 
the design of policies and other measures for 
concrete action. The multifaceted nature of the 
A mixed economy may be characterized essen-
tially by the coexistence of two basic organiza-
tional principles: i) the principle of the private 
economy, based on market relationships and 
with the profit rate as the main guide in the 
allocation of resources; and ii) the principle of 
the public economy, where the organizing prin-
ciple that prevails is the allocation of resources 
through administrative provisions or processes 
of a political nature. 
There are, in short, two different kinds of 
logic to govern allocation: one through the 
market, and the other outside of the market. 
These two kinds of logic interact both at the 
microeconomic and at the macroeconomic level. 
The first type of interaction is found in mixed-
ownership enterprises, in which private and 
public capital are articulated at the microeco-
nomic level through a relatively broad range of 
modalities. At the macroeconomic level, on the 
other hand, both kinds of logic interact through a 
combination of many economic policy measures, 
partly created by demand and partly imposed. 
These measures, in turn, may be divided into 
anti-market policies (regulations of all kinds) 
subject gives rise to many attempts at interpreta-
tion, generally contradictory to one another, and 
requires empirical methods of analysis. To a 
large extent, an understanding of State interven-
tion must still be sought in social and economic 
practice, before the theories applicable to this 
subject are fully developed. 
In this context there are three outstanding 
topics which are clearly interrelated. In section I 
we shall analyse the modes of interaction of the 
public and private sectors in the context of the 
mixed economies of the region. Next we shall 
review some basic elements for a reform of the 
PES (section II), and lastly, we shall examine the 
central characteristics of the programme of pri-
vatization (section III). In our final considera-
tions we shall formulate some questions as the 
basis for our debate. 
and pro-market policies (various measures for 
encouraging private activity). 
In the Latin American case, State interven-
tion —and in particular, public production— has 
been based on two types of considerations, both 
of them related to the allocation of resources, but 
from different points of view. The first, of a 
more academic character and with a microeco-
nomic and static focus, concentrated on correct-
ing the so-called defects of the market; the 
second, more pragmatic and with a macroeco-
nomic and dynamic focus, revolved around the 
role of the State in the process of capital 
accumulation. 
The traditional theoretical approach to an 
economic analysis of public production is based 
on the propositions of the "welfare economy". 
As is well known, given a specific distribution of 
production factors, the competitive forces in a 
market economy would generate an allocation of 
resources which is efficient by Pareto's defini-
tion. There are a number of reasons why the 
system of market prices does not provide ade-
quate signals for the efficient allocation of 
resources. In the context of this discussion, 
I 
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attention should be given to two of these rea-
sons: Í) When there are yields which increase 
with the scale of production, for example in the 
distribution of electric power, and ü) the pres-
ence of externalities, as is the case with conges-
tion in urban transit. The most common 
response to this situation in the economies of 
Latin America has been public production. 
Consequently one of the theoretical justifica-
tions for public production is found in considera-
tions of allocation efficiency; that is to say, it 
aims at achieving an efficient allocation of 
resources in the economy as a whole. In contrast, 
the argument in favour of private initiative rests 
on the role of incentives and restrictions created 
by competition in order to attain productive (or 
technical) efficiency of the enterprise (maximi-
zation of profits or minimization of costs for a 
given level of production). 
The normative focus of public-enterprise 
economy implicitly presupposes the existence of 
production efficiency. The empirical relevance 
of this assumption is important, inasmuch as 
production efficiency is a necessary condition for 
allocation efficiency (Rees, 1984), which, as has 
been pointed out, is the basis for public produc-
tion. The heterogeneity of the public-enterprise 
sector in the countries of the region makes it 
impossible to give specific answer, let alone a 
unique answer, to the question whether or not 
this assumption is valid. The danger posed to 
production efficiency by a possible difference 
between the actual modalities and the normative 
view of management was made clear long ago 
(Little, 1952). The central argument pointed to 
the complications of a context which made it 
impossible to define clearly the objectives of the 
enterprise and, at the same time, the difficulties 
in evaluating its management on the basis of 
results. 
A public enterprise must satisfy three kinds 
of logic: i) that of an entrepreneurial entity; 
ii) that of an instrument of governmental policy; 
and iü) that of a productive unit subject to public 
evaluation (Martin, 1986). The frequent lack of 
agreement between the first two kinds of logic 
(maximization of profits as opposed to effi-
ciency in attaining governmental objectives) 
helps to create an image of inefficiency of the 
public enterprise which is based on its financial 
deficit, or alternatively, on its need for compen-
satory tax resources. Parallel with this, the pres-
sure for reducing the public enterprise's 
expenditures results in a deterioration of the 
levels of service, thus damaging its valuation 
within the ambit of the third kind of logic (a 
productive unit subject to public evaluation). 
In theory, a private enterprise is guided By a 
simpler logic, namely, maximization of che 
profit rate, and a clear indicator of its perfor-
mance is the market value of its stock. Further-
more, competition in the product market 
punishes inefficient enterprises with bank-
ruptcy, while competition in the capital market 
makes it possible to shift the guidelines of the 
enterprise before it reaches a critical point in its 
management. 
However, the reality of the economies of the 
region does not agree with this model of market-
imposed discipline. The lack of competition in 
product markets, the minimal number of enter-
prises quoted on the stock exchange, their rela-
tively closed capital structure and the poor 
development, or indeed the speculative perver-
sion of capital markets, reduce quite appreciably 
the pressure on private enterprise to attain effi-
ciency in production and allocation. 
This contrast between supposed incentives 
and real incentives, both in the management of 
public enterprises and in that of private enter-
prises, is a clear indicator of the deficiencies in 
the overall functioning of the economy. An 
explanation for it must be sought in the second 
viewpoint mentioned earlier: the role of the 
State in the process of capital accumulation. 
The magnitude and rate of State interven-
tion in the Latin American economies, begin-
ning immediately after the Second World War 
—and in some countries, beginning some years 
earlier— was based on a fairly general consensus 
concerning the role that should be played by the 
State in the dynamization of the process of eco-
nomic development. This model was based, on 
the one hand, on the State's capacity to finance 
its own expenditures and reallocate the flow of 
savings in the economy and, on the other hand, 
on a broad and consistent system of regulations. 
This coherent combination of mixed produc-
tion and regulations shaped a pattern of growth 
in which two economic factors became conspicu-
ously dynamic: the State monopoly —natural 
and protected— and the protected private 
monopolies and oligopolies. In both cases, the 
lack of competition severely restricted incentives 
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for attaining efficiency in production and in the 
allocation of resources; similarly, it led —on the 
part of both State and private management— to 
a constant struggle for the appropriation of 
quasi-rents originating in reserved and incontes-
table markets. 
In this context, the logic of public production 
and that of private production have interacted in 
a pattern of increasing conflict, especially since 
the crisis in this model in the early years of the 
past decade, i) In connection with entrepre-
neurs, we observe a dual attitude towards State 
intervention: their propensity to adhere to an 
ideological discourse that blames State interven-
tion for most of their troubles and, on the other 
hand, their pressure on public resources to com-
pensate for their lack of competitiveness, to 
increase their profits or to make up losses result-
ing from mistaken decisions, ii) On the part of 
public officials, we can also observe two types of 
attitude: their intention to transfer the modali-
ties of private management mechanically to the 
public sphere, disregarding the differences in 
objectives and procedures that arise from the 
particular resource-allocation logic in each sec-
tor; and their insistence on imposing more far-
reaching regulations because they regard the 
private sector as structurally and permanently 
too weak to exercise the entrepreneurial role, or 
inevitably perverse in its modality of operation. 
Any of these positions can unquestionably be 
supported by experience: it is possible to argue 
about the "failure of nationalization", just as it is 
valid to speak of "the nationalization of failure". 
However, the point is that unless this situation 
of conflict and mutual distrust is overcome, the 
work of development and democratic coexist-
ence is less likely to succeed. In short, we must 
build the bridges that will enable us to span the 
gaps that each position insists on creating 
(ILPES, 1985). In this connection, it is relevant to 
remember that relations between the partici-
pants in the two sectors have become less and 
less secret in the modern economy; conse-
quently, the importance of negotiation has 
increased. 
It is probably time for a new agreement on 
limits between the public and private sectors, but 
is beyond doubt that there is an urgent need for 
agreements on frontier integration (with prior-
ity among them being given to an agreement on 
technological innovation and another on the 
flow of reciprocal financing). The reason is sim-
ple: the mixed nature of an economy is deter-
mined not only by the obvious coexistence of 
different forms of ownership but also, and prim-
arily, by their interactions and articulations and 
by the modalities of functioning of the economy 
as a whole. Within a democratic framework, 
both the possible new treaty and the above-
mentioned agreements should be widely dis-
cussed and open and above-board. 
The unprecedented challenges posed by the 
crisis require different solutions today; in partic-
ular, we must attain greater overall efficiency 
and make the productive structure more flexible 
in order to maximize its capacity for long-term 
adaptation to unfavourable changes and to the 
opportunities that a volatile and turbulent exter-
nal framework also offers. Thus the task of 
development requires facing the connection 
between entrepreneurship and government as a 
subtle challenge to work of social concertation. 
Only an authentic entrepreneurial force (private 
and public) can serve as a leader capable of bring-
ing about the changes that will be needed to 
modernize the productive apparatus; only 
governmental leadership, with a long-term 
vision, can distinguish the risks of technological 
dependency and reduce them through a develop-
ment policy that has the approval of society as a 
whole (ILPES, 1987). 
In this connection, the countries of the 
region are facing the challenge of an offensive 
carried on with conspicuous persistence by inter-
national financing organizations and other 
external observers, which stresses the need for 
privatization (Aylen, 1987). This proposal for a 
change in direction has entered the area of inter-
nal discussion in several countries of the region 
and has found a favourable echo in some national 
entities. Others have questioned either the foun-
dations, the magnitude or the rate of the pro-
posed change in direction. 
Although a dogmatic and indiscriminate 
application of this position must be opposed, 
there are two good reasons why the problem 
should be carefully analysed in the context of 
each national situation: one reason, which is 
political in nature, is that the idea that every-
thing must be created or resolved through State 
initiative is contradictory to the very concept of a 
mixed economy; it results in passive and depend-
ent social behaviour bearing little relation to 
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reality and to undesirable reductions in the crea-
tivity, initiative and responsibility of the various 
national entities; the other, of a technical nature, 
rests on the fact that the combination of func-
tions performed by the governmental sector 
constitutes a very complex and diversified pro-
ductive, economic and financial conglomerate 
and that, in addition, it has some perverse articu-
lations with the private sector and imposes upon 
the government a set of demands which exceed 
its available supply of real creative, negotiating, 
organizational and financial resources. 
There is also a more pragmatic reason: in the 
countries of the area, governments have adopted 
or are considering actions to redefine the rela-
tionship between the public and private sectors, 
within a framework of sharp controversy or 
In the Latin American experience, with national 
variants, the PES has been shaped predomi-
nantly in the so-called ministerial-supervision 
régime. This structure had as its purpose the 
attainment of the objectives fixed in the constit-
uent document of each enterprise, harmonizing 
its management with the policy and program-
ming established by the government for the sec-
tor in which it was active, and the granting of the 
administrative, operational and financial auto-
nomy necessary for efficient management. 
In addition, the integration of the sectoral 
ministries into a National Planning System was 
aimed at making the activities of each ministry, 
including its associated entities, compatible with 
the more general objectives of development 
policy. 
However, this formal design disregarded a 
fundamental question in the analysis of the 
problems of organization and management of 
the public sector: the fact that public enterprises 
exist in the political space of the interests asso-
ciated with a specific governmental policy. 
This omission was based on a concept of the 
State and society that was distorted by formalism 
and was inconsistent with the complex nature of 
uncertainty concerning the possible results. 
Unquestionably a serious effort of imagination 
and initiative must be made in order to find 
acceptable and viable solutions. In section III we 
shall consider the arguments and the recent 
experience of privatization programmes. 
It should also be pointed out that even if 
major successes are achieved in the process of 
privatization, transfer of management or decen-
tralization, it seems realistic to believe that a 
broad public sector will continue to exist, and 
this fact will make it necessary at the same time 
to continue and intensify the effort for moderni-
zation and improvement of the economic and 
social performance of the public sector, a subject 
which will be discussed in the next section. 
reality. It presupposed a monolithic view of the 
State apparatus, corrupting both its real rela-
tions with civil society and the characteristics of 
the process of public-policy formation within 
the State bureaucracy. 
The State apparatus is not the result of a 
rational process of structural differentiation and 
functional specialization, nor can its develop-
ment be mechanically adapted to a planned and 
coherent design. To the extent that Its various 
centres of decision divide their loyalty among 
proposals, interests and projects of different 
kinds, there is a compromising of the homoge-
neity of policies, the overall coherence and co-
ordination of decisions and the capacity to plan 
and decide on long-term questions. That is to 
say, the nature of the public productive appara-
tus and its actual administrative organizations 
are affected by the vicissitudes of a constant 
struggle within the bureaucracy, which in turn 
reflects other adversarial relationships in 
society. 
The relative lack of success of those forms of 
supervision and control may be attributed to a 
number of factors. Almost all of them are related 
in one way or another to the greater technical 
II 
The reform of the public-enterprise sector 
106 CEPAL REVIEW No. 36 / December ¡988 
and political power of enterprises in comparison 
with the authorities responsible for their super-
vision and control. Thus, in view of the inability 
to evaluate the merits of the enterprises' perfor-
mance, these tasks relate primarily, and often 
exclusively, to formal aspects. Consequently the 
focus of control is shifted to the legal and formal 
plane which characterizes the budgetary control 
of public administration and remains centred in 
a purely bureaucratic sphere. 
In general, different aspects of supervision 
and control that affect a particular area of the 
enterprise (personnel, prices, financial resour-
ces, etc.) are exercised by different entities, lead-
ing to the so-called problem of multiple 
ownerships. When supervision and control 
—functions assigned to a number of different 
organs of the central government— lack the 
necessary co-ordination to take account of their 
interactions and to give consistency to their 
development as a function of time, this may 
result in situations which are unmanageable 
from the standpoint of the unitary logic of the 
public enterprise. 
The difficulties in the functioning of this 
model of the relationship between the PES and 
the central government have been aggravated in 
recent years by two facts: the aforementioned 
process of sharp growth of the PES in almost all 
the countries of the region, and the economic 
crisis which has afflicted the Latin American 
countries since 1981-1982 and whose most 
obvious manifestation is the problem of foreign 
debt. 
The economic crisis had a significant effect 
on the relations between the PES and the central 
government. With a greater or lesser degree of 
alteration in the formal organization of this rela-
tionship, public enterprises were subjected to 
strong financial controls centred in the responsi-
ble authorities of the government's macroeco-
nomic policy. The establishment of these 
controls, whose rationale is based on the attain-
ment of external adaptation and internal stabili-
zation, through either simultaneous or 
successive processes, had serious consequences 
on the performance of public enterprises, in 
some cases even involving the cost of operation 
and the maintenance of its installed capacity.1 
Operationally, the basic trend was aimed at 
the programming and follow-up of the annual 
financial flow of the enterprises. Specifically, 
with regard to expenditures, limits were placed 
on investment, other capital expenditures and 
debt servicing (amortization and financing 
charges), as well as on personnel expenses. On 
the income side, an attempt was made to control 
the use of the enterprises' own resources, those 
derived from fiscal transfers and from internal 
and external credit operations. 
Some of the problems encountered with this 
type of control of public enterprises are worth 
identifying: i) the financial nature of the control 
predominates over the economic concept; thus, 
for example, criteria of the social or macroeco-
nomic profitability of investments are usually 
not examined; ü) the approach of the control 
system is basically annual, which is contrary to 
the physical reality of investment projects and, 
at the same time, to an ordered programming of 
operations; ii¡) procedures for the control of 
expenditures tend to be applied uniformly, 
either through indiscriminate budget cuts or 
through the quarterly or monthly rationing of 
financial disbursements; iv) while the budgetary 
process is not integrated (the budget of the PES, 
the fiscal, foreign-exchange and monetary 
budgets) and only some of its parts are subject to 
legislative approval, the attainment of the 
macroeconomic objectives results in high costs 
to the less flexible budgets; and v) a control 
system centred in the agencies responsible for 
macroeconomic policy constitutes, from the 
standpoint of institutional organization, a 
framework for a conflict of interest with the 
sectoral ministries on which public enterprises 
are functionally dependent. 
To the extent that this type of control is 
imposed abruptly and without an overall stra-
tegy —but also in a particularized manner— for 
the restructuring of the PES, it ends by closing 
the vicious circle that affects the performance of 
the public enterprise (Ayub and Hegstad, 1987). 
'In this connection, it should be recalled that although one 
cannot ignore the need to raise the level of governmental perfor-
mance and to adopt a practice of austerity in public management, 
the possible giantism in public deficits is due in large measure to an 
impact retransmitted inwards from the foreign-debt front, which 
therefore cannot be solved merely by imposing drastic restrictions 
on governmental expenditure (Costa-Filho, 1987). 
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The experience of recent years has also 
revealed a reduction in the degree of autonomy 
of governments which design and execute public 
policies, thus affecting the capacity of national 
societies for organized collective action (ECLAC, 
1988). It is essential that the vulnerability pro-
duced by the crisis should not distract the atten-
tion of Latin American countries from the 
future; this requires a significant conceptual and 
technical renovation of planning (ILPES, 1987). 
With regard to the PES, it is necessary to 
shift the focus of attention, as well as to solve an 
important problem. In the recent past, efforts 
have been concentrated on the question how 
public enterprises should be controlled, res-
tricted and utilized. Today the priority focus 
should be different: how to revivify the fading 
spirit of enterprise. In the central government 
this means developing a greater strategic capac-
ity to administer a complex of considerable mag-
nitude for industrial production and for 
furnishing services. In enterprises this requires 
emphasizing efficiency and maintaining the 
pressure on costs. 
But it is also necessary to solve another prob-
lem: the system of relationships between enter-
prises and the central government. The 
inefficiency in some public enterprises is not 
exclusively due to internal factors; in many cases 
it is associated with the institutional and legal 
structure, as well as with the informal practices 
of the system that delimits and conditions the 
action of enterprises. 
The previously mentioned heterogeneity of 
the PES discourages any attempt to formulate a 
general strategy for bringing about the necessary 
changes; this is even more true when we con-
sider the variety of situations which, in this 
aspect as in others, exist in the economies-df the 
region. Nevertheless, three possible compo-
nents that may be of interest have been identi-
fied (Boneo, 1986). 
In the first place, the reform process should 
be based on negotiation and harmonization 
rather than on formal hierarchical principles 
and the nominal distribution of authority. A 
necessary condition for this is greater transpar-
ency of the functioning of the system, which, 
among other things, requires giving priority to 
information systems, substituting quality and 
usefulness for quantity and irrelevance. One use-
ful procedure for initiating such a social and 
institutional practice is a simplified version of 
the programme agreement. On the basis of a few 
fundamental agreements, the procedure could 
evolve towards a more global, multiannual and 
public concertation. In accordance with this 
modality, the managers of each enterprise would 
increase their forecasting capacity and their flex-
ibility with regard to policies on production, 
employment, prices and investments. The cen-
tral government, for its part, would ensure 
greater efficiency in the attainment of its objec-
tives and would also evaluate compliance with 
the enterprise's guidelines on the basis of result 
indicators, as the counterjpart of greater entre-
preneurial autonomy. 
In the second place, negotiating procedures 
should be reinforced by a clear and explicit sys-
tem of incentives and sanctions related to the 
fulfilment of the agreed goals. For this reason, 
the programme agreement between the enter-
prise and the central government should be 
accompanied by a strategic plan for the enter-
prise, including its restructuring if necessary; the 
plan should make it possible to disaggregate the 
global aims and assign internal responsibilities, 
so that graduated action can be taken at the 
responsible level in the event of unjustified fail-
ure to achieve the agreed goals. Similarly, it 
would be desirable to introduce a system of 
incentives linked to increments in productivity 
and other indicators of the enterprise's 
performance. 
In the third place, in most countries of the 
region a governmental agency of some kind has 
been established to supervise all public enter-
prises or groups of such enterprises. In the con-
text of the foregoing propositions, these 
agencies should become ttje focal point of nego-
tiations between the government and the enter-
prise and should thus acquire influence over both 
of them. Their basic task would be to provide 
leadership and to give consistency to the nego-
tiating process, to verify that the agreements are 
being complied with and to supervise the system 
of incentives. 
Lastly, it should be emphasized that an over-
all but particularized strategy for the rationaliza-
tion of the PES may include among its 
components the decision to concentrate govern-
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mental efforts in areas regarded as having high 
priority. Thus, it is not uncommon to find the 
announcement, and in some cases the execution, 
of denationalization programmes with different 
Privatization is a burning issue, and like most 
issues of this kind, it has been more diligently 
advocated or attacked than understood. Never-
theless there is a growing body of analytical and 
empirical research that analyses privatization 
from a more objective point of view and makes it 
possible to identify some of the economic 
impacts of the process. Although the discussion 
was initially centred on the exchange of assets 
between the public and private sectors, the anal-
ysis of its practical application has expanded the 
range of subjects under discussion so as to 
approximate the changing pattern of relation-
ships between the two sectors. 
The reasons for the general concern about 
this subject are clear, and although they vary 
from country to country, some common basic 
questions underlie the comparative analyses. 
Three of these should be emphasizedr i) the 
imbalance in public financing, aggravated by the 
restrictions of the recent past and by the continu-
ing growth of demands and costs; ü) concern 
over the quality of public management, which 
has been negatively influenced by the vested 
interests of corporate groups and by the rigidity 
of central bureaucracies in adapting and 
responding to periods of rapid change; and 
iii) the demonstration of obvious instances of 
overall inefficiency in the economies of the 
region and the need to improve their external 
competitiveness and rationalize their internal 
functioning. 
From this point of view, greater decentrali-
zation of decisions may be viewed as one of the 
ways to mobilize resources through new proce-
dures and to overcome deficiencies in manage-
ment and, on the other hand, as a hope for 
improving the prospects of adaptation to change 
and to innovation. Nevertheless, it must be 
amplitudes and different degrees of intensity. 
Privatization, the most controversial compo-
nent of these programmes, will be analysed in 
the next section. 
pointed out that in this approach the deficiencies 
of the public sector are perceived with much 
more clarity than the real and effective oppor-
tunities afforded by the private sector; that is to 
say, a concrete image of the public sector is 
contrasted with a rather idealized vision of the 
private sector. 
The basic modalities for privatization which 
will be reviewed below exhibit reasonably well-
defined features, but their application —in dif-
ferent national contexts— will inevitably be 
varied and evoke growing attention and concern 
about its effects. It could hardly be otherwise, 
since this involves nothing more nor less than 
managing the balance between the public and 
private poles of mixed economies. 
1. Objectives 
On the subject of privatization a significant list 
of objectives has gradually been accumulated. 
Some of these objectives are: a) improving the 
level of economic performance of enterprises, 
which includes increments in their productive 
and allocation efficiency; b) finding solutions for 
the difficulties involved in the relationships 
between the agencies of the central government 
and the public enterprises; c) generating fiscal 
income through the sale of productive assets; 
d) promoting greater dissemination of stock 
ownership: democratization of ownership, or 
people's capitalism; and e) reducing the power 
of the various groups which exert corporate 
pressures on the public enterprise (suppliers, 
contractors, bureaucrats and trade unions). 
All of these objectives have been assigned to 
privatization programmes, especially in those 
countries in which more effective progress have 
been made (in this context, see Waters (1987) 
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for the United Kingdom and CORFO (1985) for 
Chile). It should be pointed out, however, that 
this multiplicity of objectives is not an unequivo-
cal indicator that the policy of privatization, as 
carried out in practice, follows any very sophisti-
cated rationale; on the contrary, such multiplic-
ity reveals the lack of a clear and solid analysis of 
its purposes and effects. Rather, as has been 
clearly indicated by Kay and Thompson (1986) 
in their analysis of the British experience, this is 
a policy in search of its rationale. 
There are three reasons for this characteri-
zation: first, growth by aggregation would indi-
cate that any additional objective that appears 
desirable or attainable is incorporated into the 
list; second, the lack of an explicit analysis of the 
compromises between objectives which are actu-
ally or potentially in conflict; and third, the fact 
that privatization in practice clearly shows that 
the objective of economic efficiency has been 
subordinated to the objective of generating fiscal 
resources2 and redistributing assets,* but espe-
cially to that of giving reality to the decision for 
privatization when this has been announced. In 
this connection, useful illustrations may be 
found in an analysis of experience with the pri-
vatization of several major enterprises in var-
ious developed countries, as presented in 
Cointreau (1986). 
2. Instruments 
As mentioned earlier, the subject of privatiza-
tion was initially centred on the interchange of 
assets between the public and private sectors. 
Gradually the subject has been expanded to take 
account of the changing pattern of relationships 
between the two sectors. In accordance with this 
greater scope of the concept of privatization, 
there has also been an increase in the number 
and type of instruments considered, which may 
be classified into three groups: 
a) Sale of assets: the exchange of private finan-
cial assets for public productive assets; 
2For a critical evaluation of the fiscal effects of privatization, 
see Mansoor (1987). 
'In this context we should distinguish between effects on the 
distribution of assets and other impacts on income distribution 
(Vernon, 1988). 
b) Deregulation: a collection of measures for 
introducing greater competition into 
markets which have previously taken the 
form of legal monopolies, or into those 
which constitute technical monopolies; 
c) Concession contracts: actions designed to 
introduce competition through the market 
into situations in which there is no market 
competition. 
The privatization of certain enterprises may 
also be based on combinations of these basic 
instruments, as will be seen below. 
a) Sale of assets. This has been the instru-
ment most widely used in ongoing privatization 
programmes. Such a sale is carried out through 
three types of procedures: the offer of stocks at a 
fixed price, generally in a sequence of partial 
operations on the stock exchange; the opening 
of bids for the purchase of successive packages of 
stocks; and direct negotiation between public 
authorities and investment groups, which are 
chiefly foreign groups. 
The first procedure requires fixing a price; 
this task is not a simple one, because the shares 
offered are often those of enterprises which pro-
duce goods without any obvious private equival-
ent, or because there is no commonly accepted 
reference pattern. Although the economic prin-
ciple that should guide the fixing of the price is 
simple (the present value of the prospective 
profits that can be made from the assets), its 
application runs into serious difficulties, in prac-
tice. For this reason, in an analysis of recent 
experience with the transfer of assets, one factor 
that stands out is the relationship between the 
price at which the shares are acquired and var-
ious indicators of their probable value.4 
Without disregarding the controversy gen-
erated by the choke of a pattern of reference for 
such comparisons, almost all analysts agree that 
there is a definite tendency towards undervalua-
tion, particularly when the sales are made during 
*ln the case of Chile the sale price has been compared with the 
book value of the shares and with other methods of asset valuation 
(see tables 3 and 4 in Errázuriz and Weinstein, 1986), and in the 
case of the United Kingdom the reference pattern used has been 
the registered value in stock-exchange operations once the quoting 
of the shares on the open market has been permitted (see table 3 in 
Kay and Thompson, 1986). Very substantial discounts are found in 
both cases. 
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periods of economic recession. However, there is 
disagreement on the question whether this is 
unavoidable, or even desirable. In any case, it is 
also evident that governments consider other 
aspects when they fix prices for the sale of shares 
(Vernon, 1987). One of these considerations 
consists in making sure that the shares offered 
for sale will in fact be placed on the market, and 
for this reason there is a general tendency to 
establish prices which are low in comparison 
with the possible objective criteria. The motives 
for this procedure are complicated: one reason is 
an attempt to avoid in this way the negative 
repercussions of a failed offer, but another goal is 
the gradual consolidation of a demand for subse-
quent offers. In any event, it may be concluded 
that the undervaluation of public property gen-
erates extraordinary benefits for those who are 
in a position to acquire the shares. 
An alternative to fixed-price sales is public 
bidding, with a minimum price, in order to gen-
erate offers for the acquisition of packages of 
shares. In reality, in those cases in which the 
asset-transfer procedures are more open, bid-
ding has been one form of governmental reac-
tion to criticism based on the low sale prices of 
the assets.5 
The need for new inputs of capital that is 
being experienced by many public enterprises 
—a need increased by the fiscal restrictions 
imposed by the external crisis of the 1980s— 
together with the reduced size and development 
of local long-term capital markets, provides the 
foundation for a third procedure consisting in 
direct negotiation with foreign investment 
groups, both public and private. As is well 
known, the outlook for an increase in direct 
foreign investment in the region is dim, even 
starting from the present low levels; this is why 
it is useful to offer effective incentives that can 
attract investment. As a general principle, it 
would be desirable that operations carried out by 
this modality should be arranged as part of a 
national policy for foreign investment. 
'In the case of rhe United Kingdom the use of this procedure 
has resulted in much smaller discounts, although it is also true that 
in some cases the authorities have not received sufficient offers to 
acquire all of the share package being bid on (see table 4 in Kay and 
Thompson, 1986). 
The bases for the recent agreement between 
Aerolíneas Argentinas and the Scandinavian 
Airlines System seem to point in this direction. 
The probable transfer of 40% of the Argentine 
company's assets is part of a more extensive 
negotiation which includes capital inputs, reno-
vation of equipment, modernization of company 
management and access to new markets. 
A different situation is found in the case of 
the operations carried out under a régime for 
converting the foreign debt into share participa-
tion, which is becoming more widespread in the 
countries of the region, although with different 
characteristics (Lahera, 1987). Where the con-
version is channeled towards existing public 
assets, a situation which is possible in some 
countries of the region but not in others, the 
result may be unfavourable to the country's 
interests. In some of these operations the for-
eign partners do not bring in any fresh capital, 
new technology or new markets for obtaining 
foreign currency. In actuality, ail that happens is 
that existing assets are transferred at low and 
strongly subsidized prices. 
Lastly, attention may be drawn to the partic-
ular case of sale at zero price, which is the dona-
tion of part of the State's share capital to broad 
social groups with low income. This proposal 
(Gerchunoff and Guadagni, 1987) seeks to rec-
oncile the democratization of ownership with 
economic efficiency in denationalization pro-
grammes, on the basis of a combination of pri-
vate management (private risk investors and 
minority investors but with control of manage-
ment) and non-State public owners (dispersion 
of majority share ownership in order to ensure 
that the controlling capitalist group will aim at 
the maximization of dividends and not only at its 
own profits). 
b) Deregulation. A recent highly systematic 
review of international evidence on the compar-
ative performance of public and private enter-
prises (Domberger and Piggott, 1986) concludes 
that competition plays a more important role 
than ownership in the promotion of productive 
efficiency. Thus any possible differences in per-
formance are directly related to the restrictions 
imposed and the opportunities afforded by a 
competitive framework in the product and capi-
tal markets. From this point of view, competi-
tion in the product market is conceived of as a 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR INTERACTION / J.M.F. Martin 111 
mechanism for detecting inefficiency (bank-
ruptcy) and competition in the capital market 
makes it possible to restore the efficiency that 
has been lost. In order to enable both mecha-
nisms to function, the privatization efforts 
should be preceded —or at the very least, 
accompanied— by deregulation programmes; 
otherwise the transfer of assets from the public 
to the private sector will not necessarily bring 
greater productive efficiency. This position is, of 
course, contrary to the view of those who main-
tain that the privatization process, in and of 
itself, will automatically lead to greater liberali-
zation and flexibility of the economy. 
The recent discussion on deregulation 
emphasizes the importance of removing barri-
ers to entry as a prerequisite for increasing real 
or potential competition in markets. In the past 
the policy of regulation was based on the eco-
nomic theory of market organization, which 
emphasizes internal conditions; this theory 
takes account of the different degrees of compe-
tition between enterprises that already exist in 
the market being considered. These internal 
conditions include both structural components 
and aspects derived from the behaviour of com-
panies: market structure, differentiation of pro-
ducts, discrimination in prices, differences in 
costs, information leaks, strategic planning, etc. 
This debate has recently been enriched by 
the theoretical proposition of contestable 
markets (Baumol et al., 1982). This proposition 
emphasizes the importance of external condi-
tions as a potential source of competition; that is 
to say, it stresses the influence that may be 
exerted on established enterprises by the possi-
bility that new enterprises will enter the market. 
In the absence of non-recoverable costs —the 
value of investments that cannot be recovered 
when production ceases— the removal of barri-
ers to entry will ensure quasi-competitive behav-
iour, even in the case of some natural 
monopolies, since if the monopolist generates 
opportunities for excessive profitability, his 
position will become vulnerable to the entry of 
potential competitors. 
Although the assumptions on which the 
contestable-market proposition is based gave 
rise to extensive debate (see Shepherd, 1984), it 
suggests possible new orientations for regula-
tory policy. Thus the relevant criterion would be 
not the number of enterprises and their respec-
tive market quotas but the facility with which 
potential competitors may enter and leave the 
market. 
However, beyond theoretical possibilities, 
the tangle of interests created around a specific 
configuration of the regulatory system consti-
tutes a formidable obstacle to any increase in 
productive efficiency achieved through greater 
competition or challengeability of markets. As 
has been correctly pointed out (Gerchunoff and 
Guadagni, 1987), in modern economies there 
exists a genuine market which confronts the 
demand and supply of regulations and around 
which both private and public interests are 
articulated. 
Of course, what is at issue here is not the 
thoughtless dismantling of the regulatory sys-
tem but rather its gradual rationalization, as 
openly as possible, in order to promote greater 
overall efficiency of the economy. Moreover, this 
task should not be looked at with an ingenuous 
concept that would disregard the existence and 
possible realignments of the groups of vested 
interests, but it is nevertheless necessary to 
shape a more functional articulation of interests 
for the establishment of a virtuous circle in the 
State-public-private relationship. 
c) Concession contracts. The third type of 
instrument consists in the granting of rights to 
the production or distribution of goods and ser-
vices in market situations characterized by the 
absence of competition, as is the case, for exam-
ple, with natural monopolies. As has already 
been pointed out, this instrument was devised in 
order to introduce competition through the use 
of the market when there is no competition in 
the market. Although originally enunciated dur-
ing the past century, this instrument was postu-
lated more recently (Demsetz, 1968) as a 
possible alternative either to public production 
or to the State regulation of private producers. 
From the point of view of its application, we may 
distinguish between two criteria for seeking 
offers, in competitive bidding for the concession: 
i) a lower unit price for the production or distri-
bution of the goods or services, and ii) a greater 
fixed sum for the concession. 
In the first case, that of a Demsetz auction, 
competition between the bidders, in so far as 
there is no collusion, will reduce the profit rate to 
112 CEPAL REVIEW No. 36 / December ¡988 
its competitive level, when the offered prices 
approach the marginal cost of production. In 
other words, the adoption of this criterion would 
avoid the allocation inefficiency of natural 
monopolies, provided that the auction is truly 
competitive. 
The second criterion would grant the conces-
sion to the producer offering the greatest fixed 
sum. Since the adjudication grants monopoly 
rights, the bids in this case would come close to 
the present value of the flow of net profits obtai-
nable during the period of the contract plus the 
assets recoverable at its termination. Conse-
quently the application of this criterion would 
increase fiscal income (a market configured as a 
monopoly is more valuable than a competitive 
market), but this would be at the expense of 
efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
The system of concession contracts is more 
appropriate in circumstances in which the 
governmental authorities want to control the 
characteristics of the services or goods to be 
produced, and also in those cases in which 
explicit public subsidies are contemplated in its 
financing. The concessions for ground transport 
services in the United Kingdom and air trans-
port services in Australia constitute recent 
examples of the application of this instrument. 
However, the desirability of such a practice 
—from the governmental point of view— 
depends on a number of factors (Domberger,, 
1986), among which we may mention the fol-
lowing: i) the bids must be competitive and pos-
sibilities for collusion must be carefully watched; 
ii) the contracts must specify precisely and 
unambiguously the characteristics of the bid; 
iii) the optimum duration of the contract should 
reconcile the conflicting interests of the authori-
ties and the concession holder; iv) the adoption 
of a regulatory framework should make possible 
the follow-up and evaluation of the contractor's 
performance in order to prevent in good time 
any deterioration in the quality of the service or 
goods; and v) the criteria for the transfer of 
assets upon termination of the concession 
should be clearly established. 
3. Interaction between objectives and 
instruments 
Table 1 presents in summary form the probable 
effects of each of the instruments on the various 
objectives assignable to privatization pro-
grammes, in the extended sense indicated above. 
On the basis of the effects identified in table 
1, we can establish alternative trajectories (Ger-
chunoff and Guadagni, 1987) for privatization 
programmes which, at least in part, enable us to 
expect heterogeneity in the public-enterprise 
sectors in the countries of Latin America. 
In this connection we should distinguish 
three basic situations within the PES: i) natural 
public monopolies (NPM); ii) legal public 
monopolies (LPM); and public enterprises in 
competitive markets (PEC). In-the case of the 
private sector we can make a distinction between 
private monopolies (PRM), generally of a tech-
nical character because of the reduced dimen-
sions of protected markets, and competitive 
private enterprises (PRE). In figure 1 we show 
alternative trajectories in the search for greater 
overall efficiency of the economy. 
Figure 1 
Trajectory ( 1 ) corresponds to the least desir-
able situation, but it is one of the most frequent 
in recent privatization programmes (Kay and 
Thompson, 1986). It involves the transfer of 
public productive assets to the private sector, 
and with it, the transfer of their monopolistic 
income. The attractive feature for governments 
is the generation of initial fiscal resources, 
although this is evidently in conflict with the 
flow of public resources in the medium and long 
terms and with distribution objectives concern-
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ing the ownership of assets. This modality 
requires the public sector to organize a regula-
tory framework; in this connection, it should be 
noted that in the great majority of cases the 
reason for public production has been that it is so 
difficult to exercise an effective regulatory func-
tion (Boneo, 1985). In theory, the transfer 
should be reflected in greater productive effi-
ciency, but international empirical evidence is 
not conclusive in this respect (Shirley, 1983). 
The effects on prices and wages depend on the 
degree to which possible increases in productive 
efficiency are translatable into lower prices and 
gains in productivity are translatable into higher 
wages. 
Trajectory (2) implies essentially the dereg-
ulation of legal public monopolies and requires 
public enterprises to operate in more competi-
tive or challengeable markets. To the extent that 
the government does not cover any possible 
operational losses of the enterprises, this would 
create incentives for an increase in productive 
efficiency, in addition to the greater efficiency 
that may be expected in the allocation of 
resources. 
Trajectory (3) also consists in the deregula-
tion of legal public monopolies, but in this case it 
is accompanied by the transfer of public produc-
tive assets to the private sector. It is in fact 
convenient to visualize this trajectory as a second 
stage of the preceding one (Brittan, 1986). 
In conclusion, and as the basis for a debate, it 
seems appropriate to present the following 
reflections: 
1. The Latin American economies exhibit 
visible signs of overall inefficiency, both in the 
public and in the private sector. In this context: 
a) the inefficiency of public enterprises should 
not be regarded as axiomatic; where it exists, it is 
often caused largely by structures that are inap-
propriate and therefore correctible; b) the 
assumption of greater efficiency in private 
Trajectory (4) corresponds to the privatiza-
tion of public enterprises that operate in com-
petitive or challengeable markets. The private 
enterprises that were nationalized because of 
precarious economic or financial conditions are 
obvious candidates for reprivatization according 
to this trajectory. It should be noted, however, 
that in some cases the continuation of public 
enterprises in competitive markets with the par-
ticipation of private enterprises may be indis-
pensable for the preservation of this market 
structure (Ayub and Hegstad, 1987). Moreover, 
there are cases, such as that of Brazil, in which 
public enterprises in competitive markets oper-
ate at high levels of efficiency, both in produc-
tion and in allocation (Oliveira, 1985), and 
therefore it is not justifiable to privatize them on 
the grounds of efficiency. What is indeed impor-
tant, however, is that the enterprise should pre-
serve the autonomy necessary for attaining its 
commercial objectives. 
Lastly, trajectory (5) consists in the conces-
sion of production or distribution rights for 
goodsland services as an alternative to public 
production in a natural-monopoly situation, the 
foundations of which have been reviewed 
recently (Roth, 1987). In this modality the criti-
cal points seem to lie in the viability of the 
establishment of detailed and precise contracts 
for the i operation of the concession and in the 
actual capacity for follow-up and control by the 
governmental authorities and the users. 
enterprises is likewise not universally valid, at 
least in the real situations of the countries of the 
region; and c) important advantages can 
undoubtedly be found in both, but the stress 
should be placed on their positive interaction in 
the context of mixed economies, competitive 
abroad and articulated within the country. 
For these reasons, we should combine dereg-
ulation operations with asset-trans fer opera-
tions, on the basis of criteria of social rationality, 
and the transfer of assets should be part of an 
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extensive and careful programme of rationaliza-
tion of the PES. 
2. Privatization —in the extended sense 
used here— has burst upon the Latin American 
scene like a power-packed idea fraught with 
ideological symbolism, but one on which a 
rational discussion in the concrete context of 
each country has not yet been formulated. We 
must emphasize the need for prudence in visual-
izing, and especially in administering, the 
change that this implies; it may lead either to a 
broad democratizing experience or to a violent 
movement towards the concentration of power 
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